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Abstract—Cryptojacking is the exploitation of victims’ com-
puter resources to mine for cryptocurrency using malicious
scripts. It has become popular after 2017 when attackers started
to exploit legal mining scripts, especially Coinhive scripts. Coin-
hive was actually a legal mining service that provided scripts
and servers for in-browser mining activities. Nevertheless, over
10 million web users had been victims every month before the
Coinhive shutdown that happened in Mar 2019. This paper
explores the new era of the cryptojacking world after Coinhive
discontinued its service. We aimed to see whether and how
attackers continue cryptojacking, generate new malicious scripts,
and developed new methods. We used a capable cryptojacking
detector named CMTracker that proposed by Hong et al. in
2018. We automatically and manually examined 2770 websites
that had been detected by CMTracker before the Coinhive
shutdown. The results revealed that 99% of sites no longer
continue cryptojacking. 1% of websites still run 8 unique mining
scripts. By tracking these mining scripts, we detected 632 unique
cryptojacking websites. Moreover, open-source investigations
(OSINT) demonstrated that attackers still use the same methods.
Therefore, we listed the typical patterns of cryptojacking. We
concluded that cryptojacking is not dead after the Coinhive
shutdown. It is still alive, but not as attractive as it used to
be. 1
Index Terms—cryptojacking, malicious script, cryptocurrency
mining, cryptomining, in-browser mining
I. INTRODUCTION
There are two ways to gain a cryptocurrency. The first one is
to buy it and the second one is to mine it. Successful miners
obtain new cryptocurrency as a reward through the mining
process. The mining is to solve complicated mathematical
problems that require processing a large number of hash-like
computation workload [1] [2]. However, mining activity is a
tough process for a regular computer user due to its financial
and technical burdens. The mining process requires high
CPU usage, thus heavy electricity consumption and receiving
high bills. As the interest in cryptocurrencies has surged,
attackers have started to use hidden malicious scripts to mine
1Preprint. This paper was presented in 2020 3rd International
Conference on Information and Computer Technologies (ICICT);
http://www.icict.org/downloads/PROGRAM.pdf
cryptocurrencies without any expense. This attack is named
“Cryptojacking” consisting of two words; Cryptocurrency and
Hijacking.
There are two types of cryptojacking attacks. First, attackers
put malicious hidden scripts on their websites. When a user
visits thesehis website, the malicious script is loaded to the
victim user’s computer and exploits the victim’s computing
power. Second, an attacker injects a script to a victim’s web-
site. In this second type attack, an attacker gain benefit using
a victim’s injected website which exploits users’ computers
who visit this website.
Cryptojacking attacks emerged and became vastly popular
after 2017. Symantec reported that they blocked approxi-
mately 16 million attacks in 2017 and blocked 69 million
attacks in 2018 with more than four times increase [3]. As
an example of this crime effect, Japan police arrested 16
individuals suspected of exploiting victim’s computer to mine
for cryptocurrency in 2018 [4].
A victim may suffer from cryptojacking concerning not only
high electricity bills but also computer’s overall performance.
A study demonstrated that a cryptojacking website affects
a victims computer by increasing temperature up to 52.8%,
decreasing performance up to 57% and multiplying CPU usage
up to 1.7x [5].
Coinhive was a company that used to provide a script-code
to enable website owners mine Monero cryptocurrency [6]
holding 30% of all mined XMR for itself [2]. Since Monero
claims that it is an untraceable cryptocurrency, it became
popular with the “easy to use” feature of Coinhive scripts after
2017.
Nevertheless, attackers immediately started to exploit those
scripts to mine cryptocurrencies. On Google, “Monero”,
“Coinhive” and “Cryptojacking” words search frequencies
significantly increased. Even though Coinhive started to pro-
vide this service with a benign purpose, the script was
maliciously used by thousands of attackers or injected into
victims’ websites within a couple of months [7]. Studies
suggested that 81% of the cryptojacking websites used scripts
provided by Coinhive [8]. Symantec reported that “stat-
dynamic.com/lib/crypta.js” script, which connects Coinhive
servers, was found even on Microsoft Store [9].
Before Coinhive shutdown the service, Hong et al. [1]
developed a novel detection system named CMTracker. Its de-
tection relies on behaviour-based profilers consisting of hash-
based and stack-based profilings. It monitors each webpage
for less than three seconds using two runtime profilers for
automatically tracking malicious scripts and related domains.
According to CMTracker, there were 868 Cryptojacking web-
sites in Alexa top 100K list. The discovery was over 260%
more comparing with the latest public reports. Also, they
found 2,770 malicious websites from 853,936 popular web
pages.
On March 8, 2019, Coinhive stopped its service claiming
the economic reasons regarding to new Monero hard fork
impacted their profitability. Also, Monero XMR value has
fallen by as much as 85 percent over the past year [10].
After those issues, the company removed even the website
“Coinhive.com” on Apr 29, 2018, by leaving this message:
“Some of you will be surprised. The decision has been made.
We will discontinue our service on March 8, 2019. It has been
a blast working on this project over the past 18 months, but to
be completely honest, it isn’t economically viable anymore.”
[11].
Coinhive made a decision affecting the cryptojacking world
significantly. In this paper, we are exploring the consequences
of this decision. We will draw a picture of this new era in
cryptojacking. We aimed to see that, after eight months of
Coinhive shutdown, whether the attackers continue this type of
cyberattacks, generate new malicious scripts, use new methods
or not.
We used two methods for examination. First, we used a
capable Cryptojacking detector named CMTracker that has
been developed by Hong et al. [1]. Second, we manually
examine 2,770 websites that had been detected before by
CMTracker to make sure whether CMTracker fails or not on
identifying cryptojacking websites and malicious scripts after
Coinhive.
The results suggested that 99% of websites that had been
detected by CMTracker before, no longer continue cryptojack-
ing. 1% of websites still continue mining with current scripts.
In addition, examining those websites manually shows us that
CMTracker can still detect the cryptojacking websites. That
means attackers still use the same methods. Since the attackers
still use the same methods, we observed that cryptojacking
patterns are clearly noticeable. We listed the patterns of
cryptojacking in the examination section.
Although the majority of cryptojacking websites (99%)
stopped their activities, we were able to track 8 unique mining
scripts derived from the remaining 1% cryptojacking websites.
As a result, we detected 632 unique cryptojacking websites.
Some of them have millions of visitors per year. In conclusion,
we would not say that cryptojacking is dead after Coinhive
shutdown. It is still alive but not attractive for the present.
II. EXAMINATION OF CRYPTOJACKING WEBSITES
We examined 2,770 websites located in CMTracker GitHub
address. The results demonstrated that, after Coinhive, while
1% of attackers continue their activities, 99% percent of them
has stopped. Also, 300 websites out of 2,770 websites still
try to connect “statdynamic.com/lib/crypta.js” script located
in dead Coinhive servers currently.
CMTracker generated several JSON files for each page. It
detected total of 155 webpages. At first, hash-based profiler
detected 114, stack-based profiler detected 41 cryptojacking
webpages. However, when we examine those webpages, we
noticed that there are duplications in the results. Once we
clear the duplications, we observed that while the hash-
based profiler found 14 unique web pages, the stack-based
profiler found 10 unique pages. Finally, we concluded that 24
webpages out of 2,770 websites still execute Cryptojacking
mining scripts in the background without users’ consent as
seen in Table I.
We also examined the 24 websites to find the unique mining
scripts. As seen in Table II, we revealed 8 running live
Cryptojacking scripts.
TABLE I
RESULTS OF CMTRACKER AFTER COIN-HIVE SHUTDOWN
Domain List Hash-based
Detection
Stack-based
Detection
Total
Raw Results 2,770 Websites 114 41 155
Cleaned Results 2,770 Websites 14 10 24
Moreover, the results suggested that the hash-based profiler
is more effective than stack-based profiler. In 4 separate tests
on 24 websites, the hash-based profiler was able to detect all
of websites, however, the stack-based profiler detected only
10 websites.
TABLE II
MINING SCRIPTS DERIVED FROM 24 WEBSITES
N Mining Script
1 bitcoin-pay.eu/perfekt/perfekta.js
2 easyhash.de/tkefrep/tkefrep.js
3 enaure.co/javas.js
4 hashing.win/46B8.js
5 lasimakiz.xyz/sadig6.js
6 minero.cc/lib/minero.min.js
7 uvuvwe.bid/jo/jo/miner compressed/webmr.js
8 webminepool.com/lib/base.js
Through a manual survey of 500 websites out of the 2,770
cryptojacking webpages detected by CMTracker, 344 were
found to be no longer running mining scripts, 92 were shut
down, 58 were still attempting to connect Coinhive using
“coinhive.min.js” script, and 6 were using other mining scripts.
Out of 500 websites we surveyed manually, 68.8% of websites
removed all hidden malicious scripts, 18.4% of websites have
stopped their service, 11.6% of websites still use Coinhive
scripts, 1.2% of websites still continue Cryptojacking activities
as seen in Table III.
TABLE III
DISTRIBUTION OF CRYPTOJACKING ACTIVITY ON 500 WEBSITES
Observation Percentage
No Malicious Hidden Script 68.8%
No Web Service 18.4%
Still Contain Coinhive Scripts 11.6%
Running Other Live Malicious Scripts 1.2%
After the Coinhive shutdown, revisiting and examination
of the original 2,770 websites demonstrated that malicious
cryptojacking activities have significantly declined by 99%.
Only 24 websites out of 2,770 websites currently contain
running mining scripts.
III. OSINT ON DETECTED CRYPTOJACKING SCRIPTS
By examining the 24 websites that run live Cryptojacking
scripts, we revealed 8 unique mining scripts. We conducted
OSINT searching and tracking down those scripts on Pub-
licWWW.com that is the source search engine. The result
suggested that 632 cyptojacking websites contain those Cryp-
tojacking mining scripts as seen in Table IV.
On the other hand, according to ”PublicWWW.com”
records, there are over 7,000 websites still contain the Coin-
hive mining scripts as of Sep 2019. However, it was over
30,000 as of Nov 2017 [12]. Thus, over 23,000 websites have
erased the Coinhive scripts after the service stopped.
TABLE IV
NUMBER OF WEBSITES USING THE DETECTED SCRIPTS FOR MINING
ACTIVITY
Mining Scripts Number of websites
minero.cc/lib/minero.min.js 275
webminepool.com/lib/base.js 121
hashing.win/46B8.js 96
*/perfekt/perfekt.js 85
*/tkefrep/tkefrep.js 30
enaure.co/javas.js 17
lasimakiz.xyz/sadig6.js 4
uvuvwe.bid/jo/jo/miner compressed/webmr.js 4
Total 632
In addition, we observed that a user in a cybersecurity blog
complained about the mining script injection attack: “I realize
someone is putting crypto miner on my pages. If I delete it
several days later it returns. My question is, how is it possible
for an attacker to inject code directly into the document?
Wouldn’t you require server credentials to access and edit
files on the server?”. [13] “perfekt.js” mining script was used
for this purpose. This incident demonstrates that attackers uses
same mining scripts that have been produced another attacker.
IV. PATTERNS OF CRYPTOJACKING
Since Coinhive was originally created to serve as a browser-
based cryptominer and it was not written with obfuscation in
mind, it was easy to detect even when it runs without the
visitor’s knowledge. On the other hand, other scripts devel-
oped after Coinhive use code obfuscation to avoid detection.
Nevertheless, even if an attacker use obfuscation techniques
to avoid detection systems, a regular user can easily detect a
cryptojacking website based on common patterns in a website.
WebSockets, WebWorkers and WebAssembly (wasm) con-
nections underlie a Cryptojacking activity to get the connec-
tions robust [7], [14], [15]. The existence of such connections
may indicate a cryptojacking activity. Miners use WebSocket
(wss://) protocol to make the user keep connected. WebSocket
is used to establish a connection with the server. It is a different
protocol from HTTP. It provides full-duplex communication
channels over a single TCP connection. Thus, it is used as a
continuous/persistent connection between a user and a server.
Besides that, a cryptojacking website runs four JavaScript
workers as threads connecting blob links. Four JavaScript
workers redirect the user to miner deployers. A blob link is
seen as four different links with octet stream type in Chrome
network activities. Thus, four java workers are employed
by a direct server (mining pool) or another website (miner
deployer). Also, those call stack threads are called “Long
Tasks” by Chrome.
Cryptojacking websites redirect the user mining deployer
or mining pool using malicious scripts. If a script code is not
obfuscated, its code usually contain “var miner”, “throttle”,
“start miner” phrases. “Throttle” function is used to limit the
maximum CPU usage during mining to avoid high CPU usage
detection.
Hardware Performance Counters (HPCs) are used to detect
a Cryptojacking activity on a browser. Since crypto-mining
worsen hardware performance dramatically by multiplying
CPU usage, increasing temperature, HPCs are another indi-
cator of attacks.
According to a recent research, Cryptojacking becomes
more profitable than ads only when a user remain in a website
longer than 5.53 minutes [5]. We observed that Cryptojackers
mostly use free movie websites to try to keep the victims
connected the website for a long time.
Finally, we can list those patterns in six categories:
1) WebSockets, WebAssembly connections
2) Four WebWorkers (JavaScript workers)
3) Long Tasks in Call Stack Threads
4) The existence of “var miner”, “throttle”, “start miner”
phrases in the redirection links
5) CPU and battery usage (hardware performance counters)
6) Free movie contents
V. CASE STUDIES
After Coinhive closure, in order to figure out other Cryp-
tojacking websites behavior in this new era, we examined the
websites below.
“cinecalidad.to” is a free movie websites which has millions
of visitors per year. This website employs a cryptojacking
script by connection mining deployer: “enaure.co/javas.js”.
Enaure.co is a domain that hosts mining scripts for cryptojack-
ing. “Cinecalidad.to” connects “Enaure.co”, and “Enaure.co”
connects “Moneroocean.stream” mining pool website that as-
sign mining tasks and return rewards to miners. The network
traffic of mining in “cinecalidad.to” relies on a WebSocket
and WebAssembly connection to get the victim permanently
connected to the server. It performs “long task” with four
JavaScript workers. JavaScript workers run on four blob links.
Also, Google chrome developer tools alert the user under
Network Timing section: “Request is not finished yet” which
means that there is a continuous connection between victim
and attacker mining server. The main mining connection
methods contain the original website, the mining deployer
website, the mining pool website and continuous connection
Wasm and WebSocket protocols as seen in Table V. In addition
to that, mining scripts employ four javascript workers as seen
in Table VI.
TABLE V
NETWORK TRAFFIC OF MINING IN “CINECALIDAD.TO”
Origin: https://www.cinecalidad.to
Request URL: wss://www.enaure.co:8181/
Identifier: “handshake”, pool: “moneroocean.stream”
pool: “moneroocean.stream”
Sec-WebSocket-Key: “6CzfNw...”
Wasm://wasm/wasm-0007c7f6/wasm
Furthermore, the script codes includes the common
cryptojacking phrases such as “startMining”, “throttleM-
iner”,“stopMining”, “wasmSupported”, “pool”, “addWorkers”,
“deleteAllWorkers”, “new Blob”. In Table VII, we listed
a regular computer hardware reaction while connecting to
“Cinecalidad.to”. According to Alexa, the rank of cinecali-
dad.to is 597 as of Oct 10, 2019. Millions of people visit it
per year. The users are from Mexico 22.7%, Venezuela 18.0%
and Argentina 9.4% , etc. [7].
TABLE VI
FOUR BLOB MINING WORKERS
blob:https://www.cinecalidad.to/f0ce0413-255c-4cbb-92ae-d0c5da05f910
blob:https://www.cinecalidad.to/5b1f270c-035e-441f-aaf7-b7c337e5db25
blob:https://www.cinecalidad.to/34b066c4-dffa-4575-93f0-c2e49fb1ed44
blob:https://www.cinecalidad.to/aebe1ff1-17c8-48db-8fdb-d725d7530be5
TABLE VII
COMPUTER HARDWARE REACTION DURING CRYPTOJACKING
Cryptojacking Speed Core Speed Multiplier Temperature
No 0.87 GHz 798.7 MHz x8.0 47 C
Yes 2.60 GHz 2595.7 MHz x26.0 85 C
The other website that we examined is “piroozgar.com”.
It is a shopping website with a 169,245 alexa global rank.
This website employs a cryptojacking script named “web-
minepool.com/lib/base.js”. It uses a different method from
“cinecalidad.to” that we examine above. “piroozgar.com” gets
the user connected the mining pool directly. Thus, mining pool
performs already a mining deployer operation by assigning
mining tasks to the user. However other operations are same.
The network traffic of mining in “piroozgar.com” relies on
a WebSocket and WebAssembly connection. It also runs
“long task” with four JavaScript workers with blob functions.
Google chrome developer tools alert the user under console:
Fig. 1. Sample Call Stack Operation of a Cryptojacking Website
“Request is not finished yet” and “Violation: Forced reflow
while executing JavaScript took 68ms, 72ms and 87ms”. We
demonstrate its a call stack operation on one of four java
workers in Figure 1. It has also cryptojacking phrases such
as “new Miner”, “new Miner”, “throttleMiner”.
Before Coinhive, Hong et al. [1] also conducted real-
world examples as case studies. In order to see what they
act after Coinhive shutdown, we examined them again. First
one is an automobile website, “planete-auto-entrepreneur.com”
is still existing. Second one “dlight.ir” which used both
Coinhive and Crypto-Loot scripts is still existing and try
to connect coinhive and coin-have mining servers. Although
all of them had also different mining scripts from Coin-
hive, interestingly, they no longer run mining scripts. The
others, “planetatvonlinehd.com/dark-temporada-1” and “book-
store.investmentu.com” which is not working.
The other interesting and popular example that we examined
is “thepiratebay.org”. This website provides free digital content
of entertainment media and software. It used to run mining
scripts during Coinhive is alive with a small note that alerts
the users about cryptomining in the bottom of main page. The
examinations were conducted on Mar 10, 2019 and on Sep 16,
2019. In the first examination, it used to run a mining script.
However in the second examination, thepiratebay does not use
mining scripts anymore.
VI. RELATED WORKS
Researchers have proposed novel detection systems in the
literature using the common patterns of cryptojacking that we
listed above. Tahir et al. [16] proposed a machine learning
approach based on hardware-assisted profiling of browser
code in real-time. Rodriguez and Posegga [17] developed
several approaches to detect in-browser mining monitoring
dynamically API calls and resource consumption. Hong et
al. [1] proposed a behavior-based detector with two runtime
profilers for automatically tracking Cryptocurrency Mining
scripts and their related domains. Ko et al. [18] developed
a cryptojacking detection solution using a dynamic analysis-
based that uses a headless browser. Wang et al. [19] proposed
a detection system named SEISMIC (Secure In-lined Script
Monitors for Interrupting Cryptojacks) based on monitoring
Wasm in-line scripts [19].
In addition, Bijmans et al. [15], Eskandar [2], Marchetto and
Liu [20], Saad et al. [8], Musch et al. [7] examined in-browser
mining of cryptocurrencies in all its aspects. They revealed
its deployment, expansion, trends, organized structures and
features statically and dynamically.
VII. RESULTS AND CONCLUSION
The results demonstrated that 99% of websites that had
been detected by CMTracker before, they no longer use hidden
malicious scripts. Only 1% of websites still run cryptominer
scripts. 24 webpages out of 2,770 websites have those scripts.
However, when we track 8 unique mining scripts derived from
those 1% webpages, we detected 632 other Cryptojacking
websites. A detail examination shows some specific patterns
of Cryptojacking and we listed them in 6 categories. Thus,
we would say that, it is not hard to detect a Cryptojacking
website. Finally, the existence of 632 cryptojacking websites
give us enough evidence to say that Cryptojacking did not
end after Coinhive shutdown. It is still alive but not as
appealing as it was before. It became less attractive not only
because Coinhive discontinued their service, but also because
it became a less lucrative source of income for website owners.
For most of the websites, ads are still more profitable than
mining. Diminishing value of Monera and stricter monitoring
by advertisements networks [15] also discouraged website
owners to rely on cryptojacking. We do not know how many
new scripts have been created after Coinhive, and how many
websites use them intentionally or unintentionally. Apparently,
a new extensive research is needed to examine the new era of
Cryptojacking.
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